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Risk Taking with Additive and Multiplicative Back-
ground risks.
We examine the eﬀects of background risks on optimal portfolio choice. Ex-
amplesof background risks include uncertainlabor income, uncertainty about
the terminal value of ﬁxed assets such as housing and uncertainty about fu-
ture tax liabilities. While some of these risks are additive and have been
amply studied, others are multiplicative in nature and have received far less
attention. The simultaneous eﬀect of both additive and multiplicative risks
has hitherto not received attention and can explain some paradoxical choice
behavior. We rationalize such behavior and show how background risks
might lead to seemingly U-shaped relative risk aversion for a representative
investor.1 Introduction
In this paper we ask how the combination of additive and multiplicativeback-
ground risks aﬀects behavior towards an independent market risk. Previous
papers have analyzed the separate eﬀects of an additive background risk and
of a multiplicative background risk on the derived risk aversion of an agent
and hence on risk taking. For example, Gollier and Pratt (1996) establish
conditions for risk vulnerability: when an unfair additive background risk
increases derived risk aversion. Similarly, Franke, Schlesinger and Stapleton
(2006) establish conditions for multiplicative risk vulnerability: when a unit
mean multiplicative background risk increases derived risk aversion.
An independent, additive, zero-mean background risk typicallytends to make
an agent more risk averse towards a market risk, leading to a more conser-
vative policy. This is easily seen by using the notion of the derived utility, as
introduced by Kihlstrom, Romer and Williams (1981) and Nachman (1981).
Kimball (1993) and Gollier and Pratt (1996) derive conditions under which
derived risk aversion increases when an additive background risk is intro-
duced, which in turn leads to less risk taking in the market. Eeckhoudt,
Gollier and Schlesinger (1996) derive conditions under which an increase in
background risk raises derived risk aversion. Their conditions are related to
those of Ross (1981), who considered the case of a background risk that had
a zero correlation with market risk, although it might not be statistically
independent.
The eﬀect of a multiplicative background risk is less well researched. In
general, this eﬀect depends critically on the relative risk aversion function
of the agent (Franke, Schlesinger and Stapleton (2006)). If utility is of the
CRRA class, then it is well known that a non-hedgeable multiplicative risk
will have no eﬀect on risk taking. For example, Campbell and Viceira (2001)
and Brennan and Xia (2002) analyse the eﬀect of a multiplicative inﬂation
risk on asset allocation. However, if the agent exhibits declining or increasing
relative risk aversion, there may be signiﬁcant eﬀects of multiplicative risks
on asset allocation. If relative risk aversion is declining and convex, then a
multiplicative background risk raises derived risk aversion. But if relative
1risk aversion is increasing and concave, it reduces derived risk aversion.1
Although the separate eﬀects of additive, and to a lesser extent, multiplicative
background risks are well established in the literature, the combined eﬀects
have not previously been derived. Here we assume the terminal wealth of the
agent is composed of market wealth x and non-market wealth z. In addition,
we assume that the market wealth x is subject to a multiplicative risk factor
y. Hence, total wealth is given by w = xy + z.
Some examples illustrate this problem setup. (1) The investor may convert
her terminal market wealth x, at the uncertain annuity rate ˜ y, into a lifetime
annuity. Then ˜ z represents income from non-market wealth, possibly includ-
ing income from another job after retirement. This income is reduced by
medical costs, insurance premia etc. and other regularly paid costs. (2) The
investor living in a small country invests abroad and converts the terminal
portfolio wealth, denominated in foreign currency, x into home currency at
the uncertain exchange rate ˜ y. Then ˜ z represents non-portfolio wealth like
housing, bequests etc., reduced by personal debt, in home currency. (3) ˜ y
may be a purchasing power index reﬂecting uncertain inﬂation. Then ˜ z is
non-market wealth in real terms, for example, the present value of a pension
which is indexed to the purchasing power index.
In this paper, in line with much of the literature, we assume the agent has
underlying preferences exhibiting constant relative risk aversion. Combining
both, a risky non-market wealth and a multiplicative background risk, leads
to a variety of results depending on the level of non-market wealth. For in-
stance, suppose that non-market wealth has a negative mean. Then both an
additive or a multiplicative background risk makes the CRRA agent act in
a more risk averse manner. Also, the two risks together reinforce this eﬀect.
However, if non-market wealth has a positive mean, an additive background
risk alone induces more risk-averse behavior of the investor; whereas a mul-
tiplicative background risk alone induces less risk-averse behavior. However,
adding both risks simultaneously does not yield some convex combination of
these two separate eﬀects. Rather, it may yield an even stronger increase
in risk aversion than the non-market wealth risk alone. Thus, the interac-
1See Franke, Schlesinger and Stapleton (2006). The intuition for this result is discussed
in Section 3, below.
2tion of both background risks needs to be considered in modeling risk-taking
decisions. The purpose of this paper is to explore these combined eﬀects.
Given risky non-market wealth and the multiplicative background risk, it is
the agent’s derived risk aversion towards market risk that determines her
optimal choice.2 We ﬁrst analyse the combined eﬀects of risky non-market
wealth and multiplicative background risk on the derived relative risk aver-
sion of the agent. We then derive the agent’s optimal demand for state-
contingent claims assuming a perfect market which is also complete regarding
tradable claims.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In the following section, we set up
the problem of maximising the expected utility of terminal wealth and de-
termine the conditions for optimal choice given risky non-market wealth and
a multiplicative background risk. In section 3, we review the existing results
on the eﬀect of additive and multiplicative background risk on risk aversion.
In section 4, we derive results showing the impact of a multiplicative risk,
given the existence of risky non-market wealth. In Section 5, we illustrate our
results by numerical examples of demand curves for state-contingent claims.
2 Conditions for Optimal Risk Taking
Consider a risk-averse agent who maximizes the expected utility of terminal
wealth . For the sake of concreteness, we assume constant relative risk aver-
sion, with marginal utility of wealth w given by u0(w) = w−γ, where γ > 0
denotes the degree of relative risk aversion.3
As discussed above, we assume that terminal wealth is given by
˜ w = ˜ x˜ y + ˜ z, (1)
where ˜ x is the chosen market wealth, ˜ y is a positive multiplicative risk factor
and ˜ z is the risky non-market wealth. Without loss of generality, E(˜ y) = 1.
2See Nachman (1982) for the notion of derived risk aversion.
3As is well known in this case, utility takes the form u(w) = lnw for γ = 1. Otherwise,
u(w) = (1 − γ)−1w1−γ.
3Market wealth ˜ x depends on the market return, e R, ˜ x = x( e R). We further
assume that e R, ˜ y and ˜ z are independent random variables. As shown in
Appendix 1, this setup can be easily generalized for the case where the risks
are correlated.4
Let
ν(x) ≡ E[u(x˜ y + ˜ z)] (2)
denote the derived utility of market wealth, x.5 Then the optimization prob-
lem can be written as
max
x(R)
E[ν(x( e R))], s.t. E[φ( e R)x( e R)] = x0, (3)
where φ(R) denotes the pricingkernel for the tradable claims, with E[φ( ˜ R)] =
1/Rf and where Rf is the gross risk-free rate and x0 is the value of the initial
market endowment of claims.
The ﬁrst-order conditions for optimizing (3) are the budget constraint to-
gether with the conditions
ν
0(x(R)) = λφ(R), ∀R, (4)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier.6 Diﬀerentiating (4) with respect to R






Letting Az,y(x) ≡ −xν00(x)/ν0(x) denote the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative
risk aversion for the derived utility, it follows from (5) that the optimal









4Note that R can be any risk factor on which contingent claims are traded.
5See Kihlstrom, Romer and Williams (1981), Nachman (1982).
6Note that for a CRRA agent her marginal utility covers the whole set of positive num-
bers. Therefore, given the usual integrability conditions, the optimal solution is interior












Condition (7) always holds, i.e. regardless of the existence of non-market
wealth and multiplicative risk. But the relative risk aversion Az,y(x) depends
on those risks and so the optimal policy does also.
In the absence of non-market wealth (z ≡ 0) and multiplicative risks (y ≡ 1),
Az,y(x) = γ due to our assumption of CRRA utility for total wealth. As our
benchmark case, we also assume that the second term (i.e. the elasticity of
the pricing kernel) is a positive constant.7 Then, lnx(R) is an increasing and
linear function of lnR. That is, the agent has a log-linear demand function
for contingent claims. Moreover, this linear function is ﬂatter, ceteris paribus,
for a higher level of relative risk aversion. This case is our benchmark case
when we analyze the agent’s policy in the presence of non-market wealth and
multiplicative risks.
3 The Separate Eﬀects of Additive and Mul-
tiplicative Background Risks on Derived Risk
Aversion: A Review
In order to analyze the combined eﬀects of additive and multiplicative back-
ground risks, we ﬁrst need various results from the literature concerning their
separate eﬀects. These are used as building blocks in the subsequent analysis.
These are all special cases of the general model in equation (1).
First, consider Az(x) ≡ Az,y(x), given y ≡ 1, i.e. the derived relative risk
aversion in the absence of multiplicative risk. Also, deﬁne z ≡ E(˜ z). We
summarize the results in the literature as follows.
7This, in turn, follows if R follows a Geometric Brownian Motion.
53.1 The Eﬀect of Non-Stochastic Non-Market Wealth
[ ˜ z ≡ z, ˜ y ≡ 1]
Intuitively, if agents have positive, non-stochastic non-market wealth, their
risk-taking behavior in the market will be more aggressive than in the absence
of this wealth. In fact, we have the following results which are similar to those
found in Bodie, Merton and Samuelson (1992):
Result 1a Non-stochastic, positive non-market wealth and no multiplicative
background risk [Bodie, et.al.]
Let ˜ z = z > 0 and ˜ y ≡ 1. Then an agent with CRRA preferences acts
towards the market risk like an agent with HARA preferences8 and derived
relative risk aversion, Az(x) < γ. Also, Az(x) is increasing in x.
Result 1b Non-stochastic, negative non-market wealth and no multiplicative
background risk [Bodie, et.al.]
Let ˜ z = z < 0 and ˜ y ≡ 1. Then an agent with CRRA preferences acts
towards the market risk like an agent with HARA preferences and derived
relative risk aversion, Az(x) > γ. Also, Az(x) is decreasing in x.
3.2 The Eﬀect of Stochastic Non-Market Wealth, z ≤
0, ˜ y ≡ 1
There is an extensive literature (see Gollier (2001)) studying the eﬀect of
a non-positive-mean, independent background risk on derived risk aversion.
This has direct implications for risk-taking behavior in the market. The
following result follows from Kimball (1993):
Result 2 Stochastic, non-positive-mean, independent ˜ z, ˜ y ≡ 1 [Kimball]
A CRRA agent with relative risk aversion γ, who is subject to an independent
background risk, ˜ z, with z ≤ 0, acts towards the market risk like an agent
with relative risk aversion Az(x) > γ.
8For HARA (hyperbolic absolute risk aversion) -utility v0(x) = (x + b)−γ for some
constant b and relative risk aversion equal to γ/(1 + b/x).
6Now we summarize results on the eﬀect of a multiplicative background in the
absence of additive background risk.
3.3 The Eﬀect of Multiplicative Background Risk
The eﬀect of a unit-mean, independent multiplicative background risk has
been studied in Franke, Schlesinger and Stapleton (2006). Although, for a
CRRA agent, a multiplicative risk, ˜ y, has no eﬀect on risk taking, we have
the following relevant results:
Result 3 Multiplicative background risk [Franke, et.al.]
a) Suppose an agent with declining, convex relative risk aversion and rela-
tive risk aversion greater than 1 is subject to a unit-mean multiplicative
background risk, then the agent becomes more risk averse towards an
independent market risk.
b) Suppose an agent with increasing, concave relative risk aversion and
relative risk aversion greater than 1 is subject to a unit-mean multiplica-
tive background risk, then the agent becomes less risk averse towards an
independent market risk.
In this paper we assume throughout an agent with CRRA preferences. How-
ever, the above results are relevant since, given non-market wealth, the agent
may act like someone with declining or increasing relative risk aversion and
hence react to a multiplicative background risk by acting in a more (or less)
risk averse manner, as we show below. The result in Franke, Schlesinger
and Stapleton (2006) [FSS] is of central importance in this paper. However,
the intuition behind the result is not obvious. While in the case of additive
background risk a wide class of utility functions exhibit risk vulnerability,
this is not true in the case of multiplicative background risk. For many util-
ity functions a multiplicative background risk induces more risk taking. To
add some intuition as to why this is the case we now compare the cases of
additive and multiplicative risks.
From Gollier and Pratt (1996), declining, convex absolute risk aversion is a
suﬃcient condition for risk vulnerability. If a(x) is absolute risk aversion and
7ˆ a(x) is derived absolute risk aversion given a zero mean additive background
risk ˜ ε, then







If a(x) is convex, the ﬁrst term is positive. Also, if both a(x) and u0(x) are
declining, the covariance term is also positive. Hence u is risk vulnerable.
By an analogous argument, if relative risk aversion is declining and convex,
then u is multiplicative risk vulnerable.9 Now suppose absolute risk aversion
is increasing and concave. Then equation (8) implies ˆ a(x) < a(x). Similarly,
increasing and concave relative risk aversion implies that a multiplicative
background risk lowers derived relative risk aversion. However, whereas in-
creasing and concave absolute risk aversion is rather unrealistic, increasing
and concave relative risk aversion is not. As pointed out above, if non-market
income is positive and non-stochastic, the CRRA agent will act like an agent
with increasing, concave relative risk aversion.
4 The Combined Eﬀects of Additive and Mul-
tiplicative Background Risk
We begin our analysis of the joint eﬀects of multiplicative background risk
and non-market wealth by considering the case where the expected value
of non-market wealth is negative. For example, the agent has some debt
whose precise value will be known and repaid at the terminal date. Although
this may not be the most common or relevant case, it is the one where the
analysis is straightforward and the results are easily understood. This is why
we address this case ﬁrst and the more relevant cases later.
9As FSS point out, we also require relative risk aversion greater than or equal to 1 in
order to preserve marginal utility declining in y.
84.1 Case 1: Negative Expected Non-Market Wealth
Result 1b above shows that a CRRA agent, with relative risk aversion γ,
and negative non-stochastic non-market wealth acts like a HARA agent with
relative risk aversion greater than γ, which is declining in x. If non-market
wealth is stochastic and has negative mean, we would expect the derived
relative risk aversion, Az(x) again to exceed γ and to be declining. This is
conﬁrmed in the following, where zmin denotes the lowest outcome of ˜ z.10
Lemma 1 If E(˜ z) ≡ z ≤ 0 and σz > 0, then the derived relative risk
aversion Az(x) → ∞ as x → −zmin and Az(x) is declining, convex and
approaches γ as x → ∞.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
Lemma 1 together with Result 3a has the following direct implication for






∂lnR|˜ z, ˜ y] denote
the slope in the absence of non- market wealth and multiplicative back-
ground risk, [in the presence of non- market wealth, given no multiplicative
background risk], [in the presence of non-market wealth and multiplicative
background risk].
Proposition 1 A random non-market wealth with non-positive expected value
induces the agent to choose a more conservative portfolio, as compared to the
case without non-market wealth, and if the agent’s level of CRRA: γ ≥ 1,











Proof: Proposition 1 follows from Lemma 1 and Result 3a.
10More formally, zmin denotes the highest level of z such that Prob(˜ z ≥ zmin) = 1.
9In Proposition 1, we deﬁne a ‘more conservative’ portfolio as one where the
demand curve for contingent claims,
dlnx
d lnR, has a ﬂatter slope everywhere,
i.e. the portfolio payoﬀ is less sensitive to the market return. The right-hand
inequality states that (non- positive) non- market wealth induces the agent to
choose a more conservative portfolio. This follows from Lemma 1. The left-
hand inequality states that the agent becomes even more conservative when
subject, in addition, to a multiplicative background risk. This latter result
stems from the fact that for the derived utility function given non-market
wealth, Az(x) ≥ γ ≥ 1 and Az(x) is declining and convex. The conclusion in
the Proposition therefore follows directly from Result 3a above.
In this case, where z < 0, all three eﬀects of z, σz, and ˜ y work in the same
direction. z < 0 by itself induces a more conservative policy. This is re-
enforced by the risk of non-market wealth, σz > 0. Also the existence of a
multiplicative risk ˜ y again reinforces this eﬀect.
4.2 Case 2: Positive Non-Market Wealth
For most agents, a more likely scenario is that the mean of non-market wealth
is positive. We ﬁrst consider the case where non-market wealth is always
positive, but risky. The non-market wealth could come from a number of
possible sources: labor income, real estate, or bequests, for example. How
should you invest in contingent claims if you expect a large bequest sometime
in the future, but have little idea as to the size of the bequest? The eﬀect
of the non-market wealth clearly depends on its risk. If the risk is small, in
comparison with the expected value, then the derived risk aversion, Az(x) <
γ, and Result 1 above implies that Az(x) is increasing in x.
If the risk is large, but the minimum value of non-market wealth is positive,
it is again likely that Az(x) < γ and increasing in x. However, this is not
always the case.11 The following Lemma characterizes Az(x) for zmin > 0.
11To prove that Az(x) may have a local maximum and a local minimum, it suﬃces to
consider an example. Let ˜ z be distributed symetrically around the mean of 30 according
to (1, 6.25%; 20, 25%; 30, 37.5%; 40, 25%; 59, 6.25%). In each pair the ﬁrst number
denotes the realisation of z and the second number its probability. Then for γ = 3, Az(x)
attains a local maximum at x = 6 and a local minimum at x = 25.
10Lemma 2 Suppose non-market wealth is strictly positive, zmin > 0.
1. Az(x) → 0 as x → 0 and ∃(xo, xoo) with xoo > xo such that, for x ≤ xo
and for x ≥ xoo, Az(x) is increasing and concave. Az(x) approaches γ
as x → ∞. Also, Az(x) < γ for all x.
2. If σz is suﬃciently small, then Az(x) is increasing and concave for all
x.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
Lemma 2 part 2. establishes that the derived relative risk aversion, Az(x),
is increasing and concave when the risk of non-market wealth is small. This
mirrors the previous result in Lemma 1 for the case where non-market wealth
is negative. Lemma 2 part 1 shows that the story is not so straightforward
when σz is large. There are ranges of x over which Az(x) is increasing and
concave, however it is possible that this is not true over some intermediate
range.
The implications of Lemma 2 for portfolio policy are now stated in the fol-
lowing Proposition. Let ymin and ymax denote the lowest and highest possible
outcomes of y. 12 Hence x ≤ xo/ymax implies xy ≤ xo,∀y and x ≥ xoo/ymin
implies xy ≥ xoo,∀y.
Proposition 2 Suppose non-market wealth is strictly positive, zmin > 0.






This eﬀect is reinforced by the existence of a multiplicative risk for
x ≤ xo/ymax and for x ≥ xoo/ymin provided that Az(xy) ≥ 1,∀xy,
dlnx
dlnR
|˜ z, ˜ y >
dlnx
dlnR
|˜ z, ∀ x ≤ x
o/ymax,x ≥ x
oo/ymin.
12More formally, ymin [ymax] denotes the highest [lowest] level of y such that prob(˜ y ≥
ymin) = 1 [prob(˜ y ≤ ymax) = 1]
112. If σz is suﬃciently small, then dlnx
dlnR|˜ z, ˜ y > dlnx
dlnR|˜ z holds for every x,
given Az(x,y) ≥ 1 ∀xy.
Proof: The Proposition follows directly from Lemma 2 and Result 3b.
As expected, an agent with positive non-market wealth follows a less con-
servative portfolio policy, in the absence of multiplicative risks. This follows
since positive non-market wealth acts as a substitute for bonds. When the
agent is also subject to a multiplicativebackground risk, she tends to become
even less conservative. Hence the portfolio choice eﬀects of the two risks tend
to reinforce each other.
4.3 Case 3: Positive Expected Non-Market Wealth,
where the Minimum Non-Market Wealth is Nega-
tive
Perhaps the most likely case for many agents is where the expected value of
non-market wealth is positive, but there is some chance that it might turn
out to be negative. For example, the size of medical or education related
liabilities may outweigh the positive beneﬁts from bequests or property, in
some future scenarios. Then the agent ends up being indebted at the terminal
date. Most agents have to consider the possibility of negative non-market
wealth. In this case, the eﬀect of non-market wealth on derivedutility is more
complex. The eﬀect of a multiplicative background risk on derived relative
risk aversion and on portfolio policy is correspondingly complex.
We begin the analysis as before by considering the possible eﬀect of non-
market wealth on derived relative risk aversion Az(x).
Lemma 3 Suppose E(˜ z) > 0 and zmin < 0. Then Az(x) → ∞ as x → −zmin
and ∃ (xo,xoo,xooo) with xo ≤ xoo ≤ xooo such that:
• Az(x) is declining and convex for x ≤ xo,
• Az(x) has a minimum at xoo,
12• Az(x) is increasing and concave for x > xooo.
Also, as x → ∞,Az(x) → γ.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
The result in Lemma 3 shows that when the expected non-market wealth
is positive, but the minimum non-market wealth negative, the behaviour of
the derived relative risk aversion, Az(x), is range dependent. First, Az(x) is
very high and declines to some level below γ. Finally, Az(x) approches γ as
x becomes large. Hence there exists a minimum of Az(x). Hence it could be
U-shaped, as illustrated by the numerical example in Figure 1. There is some
empirical evidence in support of such a U-shape for relative risk aversion. In
particular, A¨ ıt-Sahalia and Lo (2000) and Jackwerth (2000) use market data
to show that the pricing kernel reﬂects a relative risk aversion function, of
the representative agent which is U-shaped.
In the numerical example in Figure 1, we consider market wealth x in the
range (30,300). Non-market wealth is symmetrically distributed around its
mean of 30 according to the distribution (-30, 6.25%; 0, 6.25%; 30, 37.5%;
60, 25%; 90, 6.25%). In each pair the ﬁrst number denotes the realization of
z and the second number its probability. Hence ˜ z has a standard deviation
of 30 and a minimum realization of -30. For γ = 1.5 the derived relative risk
aversion Az(x) limits to inﬁnity for x = 30 and to 1.5 for large x. In between
there exists an x-range with Az(x) < γ. Az(x) is declining and convex for
x < xoo = 130 where it reaches a minimum. After that it increases gradually
to 1.5. For x > xooo = 196 it is increasing and concave.
The intuition for this U-shape is as follows. At low levels of market wealth,
the addition of a possibly negative non-market wealth dominates. The agent
must avoid a negative total wealth at all costs and, hence, risk aversion
for the derived utility function will approach inﬁnity as market wealth plus
minimal non-market wealth approaches zero. At moderately higher wealth
levels, the risk eﬀect of non-market wealth is lower and dominated by the
eﬀect of its positive mean. This leads to Az(x) less than 1.5 and increasing,
similar to Result 1a in section 3.1. Hence a minimum of Az(x) exists. At
very high levels of market wealth, non-market wealth becomes a trivial part
13of total wealth, so that Az(x) asymptotically approaches the level of relative
risk aversion without non-market wealth, which is 1.5 in our example.
The extent of the U-shape in the Az(x) function and its signiﬁcance depend
upon the values of z > 0 and σz. If σz is small in comparison with the
expected value, there may be only a small chance of z < 0 and consequently
only a small x-range in which Az(x) declines. If σz is large in comparison
with the expected value, the x-range in which Az(x) declines may be large.
Lemma 3 and Result 3 imply that the eﬀect of a multiplicative risk on de-
rived relative risk aversion is range dependent. The multiplicative risk raises
derived relative risk aversion in the range x ≤ xo/ymax and lowers it in the
range x ≥ xooo/ymin
13 Hence the U-shape of derived relative risk aversion
is preserved under the multiplicative risk, as illustrated in Figure 1. The
following proposition states the implications for portfolio choice.
Proposition 3 Suppose E(˜ z) > 0 and zmin < 0. Then non-market wealth
induces the agent to behave in a more [less] conservative manner whenever
Az(x) > [<]γ.
The addition of a multiplicative risk induces the agent to behave in a more
[less] conservative manner for x ≤ xo/ymax [x ≥ xooo/ymin], provided that
Az(xy) ≥ 1,∀xy.
Proposition 3 says ﬁrst that in this case of positive expected non-market
wealth with a negative minimum agents may act in either a more or less con-
servative manner given non-market wealth, since derived risk aversion Az(x)
can be higher or lower than γ. Also, they may react to a multiplicative back-
ground risk by becoming either more or less conservative in their portfolio
choice.
There are two interesting implications of Proposition 3. First, in the absence
of multiplicative risk, we know that σz > 0 increases derived relative risk
aversion and leads to a more conservative portfolio strategy. On the other
13This is also illustrated in Figure 1 assuming that y is binomial with realisations 0.7
and 1.3, each with probability 0.5. Then xymin +zmin = 0.7x−30 > 0 requires x > 43 so
that Az,y(x) is deﬁned only for x > 43.
14hand, with σz → 0 and z > 0, Proposition 2 impliesthat a multiplicativerisk,
σy > 0 reduces derived relative risk aversion and makes the agent act in a less
conservative manner. Since these two risks have opposite eﬀects, one might
expect the combination of the risks to lead to behaviour somewhere between
these extremes. However, this need not be the case. The interaction of the
two eﬀects is complex. If σz gets large enough so that zmin becomes negative,
the derived relative risk aversion, Az(x) changes from being increasing and
concave (when σz → 0) to being decreasing and convex, at least over some
range of low values of x. If σz is large enough, the eﬀect of a multiplicative
risk will be to make the agent choose an even more conservative portfolio.
Hence, we have an anomaly. The two risks in isolation act in opposite direc-
tions, but the two risks together may act in the same direction, re-enforcing
each other. This counter-intuitive result illustrates the point that we cannot
predict behaviour by considering the non-market wealth risk and the multi-
plicative risk separately. Whenever non-market wealth risk is large rendering
zmin negative, it turns around the way in which the multiplicative risk aﬀects
derived relative risk aversion and portfolio policy.
Proposition 3 shows that we should expect complex reactions to the back-
ground risks, even if agents have CRRA utility. Observed behaviour can
reﬂect increasing, declining, or U-shaped derived relative risk aversion.
5 Optimal Contingent Claim Choice: Numer-
ical Examples
In the following, we illustrate the previous results by some numerical exam-
ples. Our simulations are based around twelve diﬀerent scenarios, detailed in
Table 1. As we have seen above, the derived risk aversion of an agent and the
resulting optimal portfolio demand depend upon three factors, the expected
level of non-market wealth, the additive background risk associated with it,
and the multiplicative background risk. Expected non-market wealth can be
zero (the base case), positive (the most likely case) or negative. The level
of the additive background risk, measured by the standard deviation of non-
market wealth, σz, can be positive or zero. The level of the multiplicative
background risk, measured by the standard deviation, σy, can also be posi-
15tive or zero. Since all combinations are possible, there are a total of twelve
possible cases.
In order to illustrate the eﬀects of non-market wealth on portfolio choice,
we now present numerical examples for each of the cases above. In Table 2
we summarize the data on which the numerical simulations are based. We
assume a binomial market return process evolving over 7 years leading to 8
states of nature at the terminal date. The gross market return in every year
is either 90% or 130% with equal probability so that the expected annual
gross return is 110% with standard deviation 20%. The annual risk-free rate
is 5% yielding an equity premium of 5%. 14 The agent buys state-contingent
claims at date 0. 15
When we derive the agent’s static demand, x(R), we present the demand for
each of the eight outcomes of the gross market return R at year 7.
The agent has an initial wealth of 100, and has CRRA preferences with a
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, γ = 1.5. In the various cases shown below,
the expected value of the non-market wealth, z, takes on values of -20, 0 and
30.
Let e z = z + ˜ ε. Then ˜ ε in our simulation has outcomes (60, 6.25%; 30, 25%;
0, 37.5%; -30, 25%; -60, 6.25%) where the second number in each pair is the
probability. Hence, with ˜ z risk, the lowest realization of non-market wealth
is negative, in all cases. The multiplicative background risk e y is either 0.7 or
1.3 with equal probability.
5.1 Fixed (Non-Stochastic) Non-Market Wealth
In Figure 2, we illustrate the optimal solution using the log-demand function
from equation (1). We assume that γ = 1.5. The optimal demand function
is computed by solving the ﬁrst-order condition for each state subject to the
14Hence, the elasticity of the pricing kernel,
dlnφ
dlnR is equal to the equity premium, 0.05,
divided by the squared market volatility, 0.04, or 1.25.
15Of course, a truly dynamic model with learning about e z and e y would be more realistic,
but also more complex. Our point here is to show how these risks can aﬀect observed
portfolio-choice behavior, even in this simple setting.
16budget constraint. We take the three cases from Table 1, where non-market
wealth is non-stochastic and multiplicative risk is absent, i.e. cases 1,5, and
9. In case 1, the expected non-market wealth is z = 0. With z = 0, the
relative risk aversion A(x) = γ = 1.5 is a constant. Since the elasticity of the
pricing kernel (−
dlnφ
dlnR) is also a constant, the optimal log-demand for state
contingent claims is linear. This is an example of the case in Merton (1971).
Case 9 shows the eﬀect of a positive expected non-market wealth. Here
we assume that z = 30. The resulting optimal demand function is steeper
(see Figure 2), reﬂecting the lower derived relative risk aversion. It is also
concave reﬂecting the fact that, in this case, derived relative risk aversion is
increasing. Case 5 shows the eﬀect of a negative expected non-market wealth,
where z = −20. In this case, the demand curve is less steep and convex in
Figure 2, reﬂecting greater risk aversion as well as decreasing relative risk
aversion for the derived utility.
Using these cases as a starting point, we next examine the eﬀect of either
adding risk to non-market wealth, or adding a multiplicative background
risk, or both.
5.2 Background Risks
In order to delineate the cases, we again consider three alternative scenarios
in the presence of background risks: namely the cases where the expected
non-market wealth is zero, negative or positive.
5.2.1 Zero expected non-market wealth
First consider the case where the non-market wealth is always zero, e z ≡ 0.
As mentioned previously, adding the background risk e y in this case has no
eﬀect on portfolio choice. This is seen in Figure 3 by noting that the base
case (with e z ≡ 0) in case 1 yields identical results to case 2.
Now consider risky non-market wealth with zero expectation, z = 0. This
allows us to focus on pure risk eﬀects. As is known in this case, the agent
behaves in a more risk-averse manner when the non-market wealth is risky.
17This is seen in Figure 3 by comparing the base case (with e z ≡ 0) in case
1 with the case of a positive e z risk in case 3. In this case, the demand
for state contingent claims is ﬂatter, due to the more-risk-averse portfolio
choice. Moreover, the demand curve is no longer linear, but rather convex,
due to the decreasing relative risk aversion in this case. This is as predicted
by result 2 in section 3.
If we now consider both the e z risk and the e y risk as existing concurrently,
it follows from Appendix 2 that behavior will be even more risk averse than
under the e z risk alone. Although the e y risk in isolation does not aﬀect
behavior, it makes the agent worse oﬀ and here we see how it causes the agent
to behave as if she were poorer and hence more sensitive to the additional
e z risk. Moreover, it follows in this case that v(x) ≡ Eu(xe y + e z) exhibits
decreasing relative risk aversion.16 This is illustrated in case 4 of Figure 3
and illustrates Proposition 1.
5.2.2 Negative expected non-market wealth
When z < 0 and σz = 0, behavior appears to be more risk averse than
CRRA would indicate as well as exhibiting decreasing relative risk aversion.
Adding the background risk e y makes behavior seem even more risk averse.
This shows up only slightly in Figure 4 in cases 5 and 6. This illustrates
Results 1b and 3 above.
It also follows in Case 7 that adding the e z risk, but in the absence of the e y risk,
makes behavior seem more risk averse and also seem to exhibit decreasing
relative aversion, as is seen by comparing cases 5 and 7 in Figure 4. This
illustrates Result 2 above.
If we include both the e z risk and the e y risk simultaneously, we see that the
eﬀects of more risk averse behavior and of decreasing relative risk aversion
are magniﬁed. Case 8 in Figure 4 illustrates this situation.
16This follows by noting that b v(x) ≡ Eu(x+e z) satisﬁes decreasing relative risk aversion,
as shown in the appendix of this paper. Hence, from Franke, et al (2006, appendix), it
follows that adding the e y risk to obtain v(x) ≡ Eu(xe y + e z) preserves this property.
185.2.3 Positive expected non-market wealth
This is perhaps the most realistic and most interesting case. When z > 0,
but background risks are absent, the agent appears to behave in a less risk-
averse manner than CRRA would indicate. In addition, behavior appears to
exhibit increasing relative risk aversion. This is the base case 9 in Figure 5,
where the log-demand curve for contingent clams is slightly concave. If we
add the multiplicative background risk e y, behaviour here becomes slightly
less risk averse, as indicated by the slightly steeper demand curve. This is
illustrated in case 10 and is as predicted by Result 3b.17
If a risk e z is added to the non-market wealth in the absence of multiplicative
e y risk, the addition of e z increases the level of risk aversion (case 11). Since
non-market wealth is negative with positive probability, Lemma 1 applies.
Hence, for low levels of market wealth relative risk aversion is higher than γ,
then it declines to a level below γ and gradually approaches γ for high levels
of market wealth. Hard to see in Figure 5 for case 11, for low values of lnR
the log-demand curve for contingent claims is convex, indicating decreasing
relative risk aversion. But for high levelsof lnR, the demand curve is slightly
concave, indicating that relative risk aversion is increasing.
In case 12, we show the eﬀects of including both the e z risk and the e y risk
simultaneously. Although the eﬀect of the e y risk in isolation is to cause
a decrease in observed risk aversion, the e y risk also makes the agent more
sensitive to the e z risk. From Proposition 3 we know that for low levels of
market wealth both risks reinforce each other making behavior appear more
risk averse than in the presence of the e z risk only. This is evident in Figure 5
from the small slope of the case-12 curve in the range of low market returns.
For high levels of market wealth, the e y risk makes behavior appear less risk
averse than in the presence of the e z risk only. Hence in Figure 5 the slope
of the case-12 curve is smaller than that of the case-10 curve in the range of
high market returns.
17The property of increasing relative risk aversion need not always hold in this setting,
but it does in this example.
196 Conclusions
Risk taking is complicated by the personal circumstances of the agent. Here,
we have analyzed the optimal risk taking of a CRRA agent. The agent has
stochastic non-market wealth and is also subject to a multiplicative back-
ground risk. If we only observe the portfolio choice of the agent, it might
be diﬃcult to observe anything that looks similar to her underlying CRRA
preferences. The existence of non-market wealth may cause the agent to act
as if her utility had increasing or declining relative risk aversion, depending
on the size and risk of the non-market wealth. The response to a multiplica-
tive background risk crucially depends upon the mean of non-market wealth
and its riskiness .
Consideration of the additive non-market wealth risk and the multiplicative
background risk together in one model is important, since the combinedeﬀect
can be quite diﬀerent from the eﬀect of one of these risks alone. Consider the
case in which non-market wealth has positive expectation but is not risky.
Then the eﬀect of the multiplicative risk alone is to increase risk taking,
whereas we may see the opposite eﬀect when non-market wealth risk is also
risky. Ignoring the interaction eﬀects between the risks can lead to incorrect
predictions of the eﬀect of background risks on portfolio policies.
In our model, resolution of the uncertainty surrounding the non-market
wealth risk and multiplicative background risks only takes place at the termi-
nal date. We solve a single-period model for the optimal demand function for
state-contingent claims. However, if the market for the risky asset is dynami-
cally complete, this function can be representedby a dynamic asset-allocation
strategy. This strategy is complicated by background risks, suggesting that
simple dynamic strategies are likely to be sub-optimal.
20Table 1: Twelve Cases of Expected Non-Market Wealth,
Additive Background Risk and Multiplicative Background Risk
Non-stochastic Non-stochastic Stochastic Stochastic
non-market wealth non-market wealth non-market wealth non-market wealth
No multiplicative Multiplicative No multiplicative Multiplicative
risk risk risk risk
Zero-mean Case 1: z = 0, Case 2: z = 0 Case 3: z = 0 Case 4: z = 0
non-market σy = 0, σz = 0 σy > 0, σz = 0 σy = 0, σz > 0 σy > 0, σz > 0
wealth
Negative-mean Case 5: z < 0 Case 6: z < 0 Case 7: z < 0 Case 8: z < 0
non-market σy = 0, σz = 0 σy > 0, σz = 0 σy = 0, σz > 0 σy > 0, σz > 0
wealth
Positive-mean Case 9: z > 0 Case 10: z > 0 Case 11: z > 0 Case 12: z > 0
non-market σy = 0, σz = 0 σy > 0, σz = 0 σy = 0, σz > 0 σy > 0, σz > 0
wealth
1. z is the mean of non-market wealth
2. σz is the standard deviation of the non-market wealth
3. σy is the standard deviation of the multiplicative risk factor
21Table 2: Portfolio Optimisation Example: Data
Annual Expected Gross
Return on Market 1.1 Coeﬃcient of
Annual Risk-free Rate 5% Relative Risk aversion, γ 1.5
Expected Non-market
Annual Volatility of Wealth, z -20, 0, 30
Market Return, σm 20% Investible wealth, x0 100
Standard deviation of
Non-market wealth σz 0, 30
Standard deviation of
Multiplicative risk σy 0, 0.3
1. We assume that the market return is represented by a discrete binomial
process, with a mean return of 10 % over each of the 7 years. The volatility
of the underlying process, σm, is 20%.
2. The annual risk-free rate of interest is 5%.
3. In the right hand columns we show the agent characteristics. The coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion is γ =1.5.
22Notes for Figures
In Figures 2-5, the trio (z,σz,σy) signiﬁes the levels of expected non-market wealth,
the risk of non-market wealth and the e y risk.
1. Figure 1 depicts the derived RRA for γ = 1.5 and positive ﬁxed non-market
wealth z = 30 and the derived RRA for risky non-market wealth with expec-
tation 30. The probability distribution of z is : z = 30±60 with probability
1/16, z = 30 ± 30 with probability 4/16, and z = 30 with probability 6/16.
Also, the derived relative risk aversion is shown where y is 0.7 or 1.3 with
equal probability. The graph shows the derived relative risk aversion a) in
the absence of both additive and multiplicative background risks, b) in the
absence of one of the background risks, c) in the presence of both additive
and multiplicative background risks.
2. In Figure 2, we plot the logarithm of the portfolio gross return against the
logarithm of the market gross return, for the case where there is no non-
market wealth risk and no e y risk. The expected return on the market is
10% and the volatility of the market is 20%. The coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion is γ = 1.5. The expected non-market wealth is z = 0 in case 1,
z = −20 in case 5, and z = 30 in case 9.
3. In Figure 3, we compare four diﬀerent cases. In each case, the expected value
of the non-market wealth is z = 0, while the market data and the coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion are the same as in the example in Figure 2. In case
1 we assume that there is no risk, i.e. neither non-market wealth risk nor e y
risk. In case 2, the risk of the non-market wealth is σz = 0 and the e y risk
σy = 0.3. In case 3, the risk of the non-market wealth is σz = 30 and the e y
risk σy = 0. In case 4, the risk of the non-market wealth is σz = 30 and the
e y risk is σy = 0.3.
4. In Figure 4, we compare four diﬀerent scenarios. In each case, the expected
value of the non-market wealth is z = −20, while the market data and the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion are the same as in the example in Figure
2. In case 5 we assume that there is no risk, i.e. neither non-market wealth
risk nor e y risk. In case 6, the risk of the non-market wealth is σz = 0 and the
e y risk σy = 0.3. In case 7, the risk of the non-market wealth is σz = 30 and
23the e y risk σy = 0. In case 8, the risk of the non-market wealth is σz = 30
and the e y risk is σy = 0.3.
5. In Figure 5, we compare four diﬀerent scenarios. In each case, the expected
value of the non-market wealth is z = 30, while the market data and the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is the same as in the example in Figure 2.
In case 9 we assume that there is no risk, i.e. neither non-market wealth risk
nor e y risk. In case 10, the risk of the non-market wealth is σz = 0 and the e y
risk σy = 0.3. In case 11, the risk of the non-market wealth is σz = 30 and
the e y risk σy = 0. In case 12, the risk of the non-market wealth is σz = 30
and the e y risk is σy = 0.3.
24Appendix 1: A Generalized Model to Capture
the Dependence of Background Risks on the
Market Return
The above model does not account for possible correlation between the mar-
ket return and the two background risks. There are good reasons to believe
that the multiplicative background rate could be correlated with the market
return. For example, in the case where the multiplicative background rate is
an annuity rate, it is likely that this rate is correlated with the return on the
market portfolio. Also, non-market wealth could depend on similar factors
to those that determine market wealth. However, to the extent that these
background risks are dependent on the market return, simple adjustments
to the market wealth demand, x( ˜ R), can be made to partially hedge these
risks. In this section, we show how the solution to the simple model above
can be applied to account for correlation.
To generalize the model, we assume that the consumable wealth is
˜ w = ˜ X ˜ Y + ˜ Z,
where ˜ X = X( ˜ R) is the market wealth, ˜ Y = Y ( ˜ R)˜ y, E˜ y = 1 is the multi-
plicative risk factor and ˜ Z = Z( ˜ R)Y ( ˜ R)˜ y + ˜ z is the non-market wealth. In
this model, Y ( ˜ R) captures the dependence of the multiplicative risk factor
on the market return and Z( ˜ R) the dependence of non-market wealth on
the market return. Here we assume that ˜ y and ˜ z are independent random
variables
In this generalized model, the terminal wealth can therefore be written
˜ w = [X( e R) + Z(R)]Y ( ˜ R)˜ y + ˜ z, (9)
where ˜ z, ˜ y and ˜ R are independent risks. The agent chooses X(R) to maximize
expected utility of wealth subject to a budget constraint
max
X(R)
E[u([X( e R) + Z( ˜ R)]Y ( ˜ R)˜ y + ˜ z)], s.t. E[ˆ φ( e R)X( e R)] = X0, (10)
where X0 is the agent’s initial endowment of market wealth and ˆ φ( e R) is the
pricing kernel.
25To solve for the optimal demand, X∗(R), we substitute X(R) by x(R) deﬁned
as
x(R) ≡ [X(R) + Z(R)]Y (R), ∀R, (11)
and then obtain the transformed problem
max
x(R)
E[u(˜ w)], s.t. E[ˆ φ( e R)
x( e R)
Y ( e R)
] = X0 + E[ˆ φ( e R)Z( ˜ R)], (12)
where
˜ w = x( ˜ R)˜ y + ˜ z. (13)
Deﬁning a transformed pricing kernel:
φ(R) ≡ ˆ φ(R)/(Y (R))/E(1/Y ( ˜ R)),
and
x0 ≡ [X0 + E(ˆ φ( e R)Z( e R)]/E(1/Y ( e R)),
the transformed problem can be written:
max
x(R)
E[u(x( e R)˜ y + ˜ z)], s.t. E[φ( e R)x( e R)] = x0. (14)
The transformation of problem (10) into problem (3), which involves x( ˜ R), ˜ y,
and ˜ z, allows us to solve a simpler problem involving background risks which
are independent of ˜ R. The optimal solution x∗(R) can then be translated
into X∗(R) using equation (11). To solve (3), we again deﬁne ν(x) as in (2).
In this paper, we therefore concentrate on solving problem (3), for the case
where ˜ R, ˜ z and ˜ y are independent risks.
26Appendix 2: Proof of Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 1:
Let A(x + z) ≡ −u00(x + z)x/u0(x + z). Then
Az(x) =
E[−u00(x + ˜ z)]
E[u0(x + ˜ z)]
x = E
"
u0(x + ˜ z)
Eu0(x + ˜ z)
A(x + ˜ z)
#
≡ E
Q[A(x + ˜ z)] = γE
Q
￿ x
x + ˜ z
￿
. (15)
Az(x) → ∞ for x → −zmin, since A(x + zmin) goes to inﬁnity. If x →
∞,Az(x) → γ.
Claim 1: Given the conditions of Lemma 1, Az(x) is declining.
Proof of claim 1
Let z ≡ E(˜ z) and deﬁne b v(x) ≡ u(x + z). Then b v(x) exhibits standard
risk aversion and either constant or decreasing relative risk aversion. Deﬁne
v(x) = Eu(x + ˜ z). Then
v
0(x) = Eb v
0(x + ˜ z − z) ≡ b v
0(x − ψ), (16)
where ψ denotes Kimball’s (1990) precautionary premium for ˜ z − z.
Relative risk aversion for v(x) is then calculated as
Az(x) = −
xb v00(x − ψ)(1 − ψ0)
b v0(x − ψ)







b A(x − ψ) ≡ −
b v00(x − ψ)
b v0(x − ψ)
(x − ψ).
Since b v exhibits standard risk aversion, we know from Kimball (1993) that






z(x) = b A





27+ b A(x − ψ) ·
(−ψ00)(1 −
ψ






The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side in (18) is non-positive by the assump-
tions. The second term is negative since ψ00 > 0, which follows from Franke
et al (1998, Lemma 2). Hence, A0
z(x) < 0 .
Claim 2: Given the conditions of Lemma 1, Az(x) is convex.
Proof of claim 2
First, we show that if u is a HARA-utility function with γ > 0, then ϕ0(x) <
0,ϕ00(x) > 0 and ϕ000(x) < 0.
Franke et al (1998) have shown ϕ0(x) < 0 and ϕ00(x) > 0. Therefore ϕ000(x) <
0 remains to be shown. For notational convenience, let ν = x + z and
˜ z − z = σ˜ η, where ˜ η is a random variable with mean zero and unit variance.
We have
(ν − ψ)
























































































































































This is equivalent to ψ000 < 0, q.e.d.
Now we show that A00
z(x) > 0.
In the HARA case,
Az(x) = γ
1 − ψ0(x)
x + z − ψ(x)
x









[γ − Az(x)]. (19)
29Diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst term of (19) w.r.t. x yields
−γ
ψ000(x)x
x + z − ψ(x)
+
ψ00(x)
x + z − ψ(x)
[Az(x) − γ], (20)
which is positive, since ψ000(x) < 0, as shown above. Also, the second term
in (19) clearly increases with x, since A0
z(x) < 0. Hence, A00
z(x) > 0.2
Proof of Lemma 2
To prove Lemma 2, part 1, ﬁrst, note from equation (15) Az(x) < γ,∀x.




x + ˜ z
￿
and x + ˜ z > 0, Az(x) → 0 for x → 0.
Next, we show that Az(x) is increasing and concave for x ≤ xo. In equation
(19), the ﬁrst term goes to zero for x → 0, while the second term is positive.






x + ˜ z
￿
> 0
and [γ − Az(x)] → γ for x → 0. Hence, A0
z(x) > 0 for x → 0.
A00
z(x) is given by (20) plus the derivative of EQ(x + ˜ z)−1[γ − Az(x)] with
respect to x. For x → 0, the ﬁrst term in (20) goes to zero while the second
term is negative. Also, EQ(x+˜ z)−1[γ−Az(x)] declines in x since each factor
is positive and declining. Hence, A00
z(x) < 0 for x ≤ xo.
Third, we show that Az(x) is increasing and convex for x ≥ xoo. Given a
CRRA-utility function,
Az(x) = γ
E(x + ˜ z)−γ−1
E(x + ˜ z)−γ x
= γ
[x + z − ϕ]−γ−1







30Since we now consider large values of x, we may regard ˜ ε = ˜ z − z as a small
risk in the sense of Pratt (1964). Technically, divide x+ ˜ z by a large positive
constant c so that σ(˜ ε/c) is a small risk. Then, dropping c for notational














1 + ϕ/(x + z)





x + z + ϕ






2 σ2(˜ ε)(x + z)−2
1 −
γ+1
2 σ2(˜ ε)(x + z)−2
For large values of x, the second fraction converges much faster to 1 than the
ﬁrst fraction because the second fraction depends on (x + z)−2. Therefore,
Az(x) → γ
x
x+z < γ and ﬁnally to γ. Hence, Az(x) is increasing for large
values of x.
Finally, in the last equation the ﬁrst fraction is concave in x while the second
is convex. Again, for high values of x, the ﬁrst fraction “dominates” the
second, which movesmuchfaster to 1. Hence, Az(x) is increasing and concave
for x ≥ xoo.
To prove Lemma 2, part 2, note that for a small σz and positive z, relativerisk
aversion is similar to that of a HARA function without non-market wealth
risk. It follows that the relative risk aversion of the derived utility function
is increasing and concave.
2





(x + ˜ z)
Eu
0(x + ˜ z)
x





x + ˜ z
￿
.
Hence, Az(x) → ∞ for x → x = −zmin where zmin is the minimal value of
z with positive probability (density). Also, A
0
z(x) → −∞ for x → x. Also,
Az(x) → γ for x → ∞. Since Az(x) > 0 for x > x, A
00
z,ε(x) > 0 is implied for
some range x ∈ (x,x◦) with x◦ > x.
Next, by the same argument as used in Lemma 2, part 1, Az(x) is increasing
and concave for large values of x. This implies a) that there exists a ﬁnite
x◦◦ at which Az(x) attains a minimum, and b) there exists some x◦◦◦ > x◦◦
such that Az(x) is increasing and concave in x for x > x◦◦◦ .
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